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From Smith to Smickle:
The Charter’s Minimal Impact on
Mandatory Minimum Sentences
Debra Parkes*
I. MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES IN CANADA:
GROWTH AND POPULAR APPEAL
On March 13, 2012, Bill C-10, the Safe Streets and Communities
Act,1 received Royal Assent. Among other significant changes to criminal
and penal law,2 the Bill added new mandatory minimum sentences,
including a number to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.3 With
these amendments, the number of mandatory minimum sentences
approaches 100.4 In 1987, when the Supreme Court of Canada decided R.
v. Smith,5 the foundational case interpreting section 12 of the Canadian
*

Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Manitoba. The author thanks Brendan
Harvey for his research assistance, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
for its support of this research, and Isabel Grant for her insightful comments on an earlier draft of
this article.
1
Bill C-10, An Act to enact the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act and to amend the State
Immunity Act, the Criminal Code, the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the Corrections and
Conditional Release Act, the Youth Criminal Justice Act, the Immigration and Refugee Protection
Act and other Acts, S.C. 2012, c. 1.
2
Bill C-10 was dubbed the Omnibus Crime Bill because it combined nine bills that had
been dealt with separately during the previous parliamentary session, making substantial and wideranging changes to a number of statutes. Changes include adding further restrictions on the
availability of conditional sentences, making “protection of society” the fundamental principle of the
Youth Criminal Justice Act, S.C. 2002, c. 1, reducing the availability of pardons, and replacing as a
guiding principle for corrections a commitment to “us[ing] the least restrictive measures consistent
with the protection of the public, staff members and offenders” with a new principle that the
measures “are limited to only what is necessary and proportionate to attain the purposes of this Act”.
3
S.C. 1996, c. 19.
4
By my count there are now 84 mandatory minimum sentences in the Criminal Code,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, and 14 in the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, id. (counting a hybrid
offence as one even where there is a minimum sentence for both indictable and summary options;
and counting a first offence minimum as one and a subsequent offence minimum as another). There
are other ways to count that would yield a higher or lower number, but the key point is that we have
witnessed a rapid proliferation of mandatory sentences, beginning in 1996 and escalating from 2006present.
5
[1987] S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Smith”].
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Charter of Rights and Freedoms,6 the right to be free from “cruel and
unusual treatment or punishment”, there were just nine mandatory
minimum sentences on the books.7 Coinciding with the passage of Bill
C-10 through Parliament, and some high-profile opposition to the Bill,8 a
justice of the Ontario Superior Court released her decision in R. v.
Smickle,9 declaring the three-year minimum penalty for possession of a
loaded firearm invalid as constituting cruel and unusual punishment
contrary to section 12 of the Charter. The decision has been heralded as a
harbinger of future Charter challenges to provisions of Bill C-10.10 For
example, David Daubney, former General Counsel, Criminal Law Policy
and Coordinator of Sentencing Reform at Justice Canada, said in his blog
upon the passage of Bill C-10:
The proliferation of mandatory minimum sentencing will lead to fewer
guilty pleas, significant processing delays, big increases in the number
of accused persons awaiting trial in already overcrowded provincial
remand facilities and just plain injustice as discretion is moved from
judges to prosecutors. There will be many more Charter challenges and
acquittals. Canadians will be less safe.11

Much could be (and has been) said about the extent to which mandatory minimum sentences are bad policy.12 Their proliferation has been
6

Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
7
Julian V. Roberts, Nicole Crutcher & Paul Verbrugge, “Public Attitudes to Sentencing in
Canada: Exploring Recent Findings” (2007) 49:1 Can. J. Crimin. & Crim. Jus. 75, at 81 [hereinafter
“Roberts, Crutcher & Verbrugge”].
8
For example, an online campaign by a youth-oriented organization, Lead Now, organized
rallies, demonstrations at MP’s offices, and an e-mail campaign that resulted in over 30,000
Canadians sending messages urging Senators to vote against Bill C-10. See Lead Now, Tell the
Senate: Don’t rubber stamp the Crime Bill, online: Lead Now <http://leadnow.ca/keep-canada-safe>
[hereinafter “Lead Now”]. A number of provincial governments, led by Quebec, expressed
opposition to the Bill and the financial strain it would put on provincial budgets. See The Canadian
Press, Provincial pleas for federal crime bill funding dismissed, online: CBCNews
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/prince-edward-island/story/2012/01/26/pei-crime-bill-justice-ministermeeting-584.html> [hereinafter “The Canadian Press”].
9
[2012] O.J. No. 612, 280 C.C.C. (3d) 365 (Ont. S.C.J.) [hereinafter “Smickle”].
10
Liberal MP Irwin Cotler has suggested that Bill C-10 will face numerous Charter challenges. Cotler asked the Minister of Justice, Rob Nicholson, a number of questions in the House of
Commons related to the government’s preparedness for such constitutional challenges. See House of
Commons Debates, 41st Parl., 1st Sess., No. 103 (March 30, 2012) at 6739 (Hon. Irwin Cotler)
[hereinafter “House of Commons Debates”].
11
David Daubney, “Sad day for Canadians” (March 11, 2012), online: David Daubney
Blog <http://www.daviddaubney.com/2012/03/sad-day-for-canadians.html>.
12
See, e.g., Paula Mallea, The Fear Factor: Stephen Harper’s “Tough on Crime” Agenda
(Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2010); Michael Tonry, “The Mostly Unintended
Effects of Mandatory Penalties: Two Centuries of Consistent Findings” (2009) 38:1 Crime and
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undertaken by legislators in the face of a massive body of evidence,
accumulated over nearly 50 years, showing that minimum sentences not
only do not deliver on their promise to deter crime,13 but that they have
many negative, unintended effects such as fostering circumvention by
justice system participants and reducing transparency and accountability
by pushing discretion down to prosecutors rather than to sentencing
judges.14 They create distortions in sentencing, ratcheting up the “floor”
such that sentences become longer overall, with negative societal returns.
Legislators pursue mandatory minimum sentences, in the face of such
evidence, because they are seen as politically popular, appealing to large
segments of the electorate who have little information about the principles and operation of the criminal justice system. However, research into
public support for mandatory minimum sentences reveals a more
complex picture in which the principle of proportionality (which is
compromised by mandatory minimum sentences) is highly valued by
members of the public.15
The appeal of mandatory penalties is rooted in a distrust of the judiciary. They are a pointed response to a perceived problem of lenient
sentencing,16 a perception that virtually all members of the legal and
judicial communities reject and that only tends to make any sense when
one compares sentences in Canada to those in the United States, a
jurisdiction which has (by far) the highest incarceration rate in the
world.17 Results of Canadian public opinion polls show a perception of
Justice 65 [hereinafter “Tonry”]; Mark Mauer, “The Impact of Mandatory Minimum Penalties in
Federal Sentencing” (2010) 94:1 Judicature 6; Athar K. Malik, “Mandatory Minimum Sentences:
Shackling Judicial Discretion for Justice or Political Expediency?” (2007) 53:2 Crim. L.Q. 236
[hereinafter “Malik”]. See also the various articles published from the symposium, “Mandatory
Minimum Sentences: Law & Policy” (2001) 39:2&3 Osgoode Hall L.J. 261.
13
Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, “Sentence Severity and Crime: Accepting
the Null Hypothesis” (2003) 30 Crime and Justice 143.
14
Tonry, supra, note 12.
15
See Julian V. Roberts, “Public Opinion and Mandatory Sentencing: A Review of International Findings” (2003) 30 Criminal Justice and Behavior 483 (drawing on research in the United
Kingdom, the United States, Canada and Australia). Roberts concludes that when presented with a
summary of basic facts about real cases, members of the public tend to oppose mandatory minimum
sentences. On the other hand, a general question, without context or reference to the range of cases
that would be caught, nor to the various principles of sentencing, tends to elicit a more positive view
of mandatory sentences.
16
Roberts, Crutcher & Verbrugge, supra, note 7.
17
As of 2011, the United States had the highest prison population rate in the world, at 743
per 100,000 of the national population, followed by Rwanda (595) and Russia (568). Nearly 60 per
cent of countries have prison populations below 150 per 100,000. Canada’s prison population in
2011 was 117 per 100,000. Roy Walmsley, World Prison Population List, 9th ed., online:
International Centre for Prison Studies <http://www.idcr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/WPPL9-22.pdf>.
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leniency in sentencing, a finding that is consistent with polling data in
other comparable jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom.18
Given the critique of the judiciary that is implicit in the legislative
adoption of mandatory sentences, it is interesting to examine how judges
have dealt with challenges to the constitutionality of these provisions. As
other commentators have noted, the Supreme Court of Canada has
generally taken a deferential approach in these cases,19 setting a high
threshold of “gross disproportionality” for a mandatory sentence to
constitute “cruel and unusual punishment” prohibited by section 12, and
accepting mandatory sentences as a valid and proportionate legislative
response to the goal of reducing crime and protecting society.20
The most recent round of parliamentary and public debate around
mandatory sentencing featured a higher level of opposition to the use of
these provisions (at least in relation to drug offences) than had been seen
in previous years.21 The assertion was often made that in addition to
clogging the courts,22 the mandatory minimum sentences in Bill C-10
will not withstand a constitutional challenge.23 Given the prominence of
this debate, coinciding as it did with the Smickle decision which a
number of commentators argue was a sign of constitutional challenges to
come,24 this paper attempts to assess the impact that the Charter has had,
and may have in the near future, on mandatory minimum sentences and
their proliferation. To answer those questions, the paper will first briefly
review the Supreme Court case law on the constitutionality of mandatory
minimum sentences. The next two sections will outline the approach
18

Roberts, Crutcher & Verbrugge, supra, note 7, at 83-84.
See, e.g., Benjamin L. Berger, “A More Lasting Comfort? The Politics of Minimum
Sentences, the Rule of Law and R. v. Ferguson” (2009) 47 S.C.L.R. (2d) 101, at 105 [hereinafter
“Berger”]; Lisa Dufraimont, “R. v. Ferguson and the Search for a Coherent Approach to Mandatory
Minimum Sentences under Section 12” (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 459 [hereinafter “Dufraimont”];
Malik, supra, note 12; and Kent Roach, “Searching for Smith, The Constitutionality of Mandatory
Sentences” (2001) 39:2&3 Osgoode Hall L.J. 367 [hereinafter “Roach, ‘Searching for Smith’”].
20
I have noted in the related context of prisoners’ rights cases that, with a few notable exceptions, Canadian courts have continued a pre-Charter trend of deference to correctional decisions
and policies. Debra Parkes, “A Prisoners’ Charter? Reflections on Prisoner Litigation Under the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (2007) 40:2 U.B.C. L. Rev. 629.
21
Lead Now, supra, note 8; The Canadian Press, supra, note 8.
22
Kim Mackrael, “Tory crime bill to put pressure on courts,” The Globe and Mail (December 19, 2011), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/tory-crime-bill-to-put-pressureon-courts/article2277143/>.
23
House of Commons Debates, supra, note 10; CBC News Canada “What worries critics
about omnibus crime bill”, CBC News (March 6, 2012), online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/
news/canada/story/2012/03/06/f-bill-c10-objections.html>.
24
Cristin Schmitz, “No win for default sentencing” The Lawyers Weekly (February 24,
2012), at 1.
19
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taken in the recent Smickle decision in the Ontario Superior Court of
Justice before moving on to argue that courts should subject the purported goals, justifications and impacts of mandatory minimum sentences to a more searching form of Charter scrutiny as we enter the
fourth decade of the Charter’s operation.

II. SECTION 12, MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES
AND CHARTER MINIMALISM
Smith25 is the starting point, and indeed the high-water mark, in the
Supreme Court’s interpretation and application of section 12 of the
Charter which provides that “[e]veryone has the right not to be subjected
to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.”26 In Smith, a majority
of the Court declared invalid a section of the Narcotic Control Act27
which imposed a mandatory minimum sentence of seven years imprisonment for importing a narcotic into Canada.
The majority decision penned by Lamer J. established that a section
12 analysis will proceed in two stages when the constitutionality of a
minimum sentence is challenged. First, the court must consider whether
the minimum sentence amounts to cruel and unusual punishment based
on the circumstances of the individual before the court. If the answer is
no then the court will proceed to consider whether the minimum sentence
would be cruel and unusual if applied to a “reasonable hypothetical”. In
Smith, it was the reasonable hypothetical — a person with no criminal
record who brings a single marijuana joint across the border — that the
Court found to violate section 12. Smith himself had been convicted of
importing seven-and-a-half ounces of cocaine. Ultimately, the majority
states that the standard to be applied is one of “gross disproportionality”
and not whether the sentence is “merely excessive”.28 For the first-time
offender with one joint, it is not particularly difficult to conclude that the
seven years in prison is grossly disproportionate.

25

Smith, supra, note 5.
Supra, note 6; for a discussion of the pre-Charter roots and interpretation of the prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishment”, see Michael Jackson, “Cruel and Unusual Treatment or
Punishment?” (1982) Charter Edition U.B.C. L. Rev. 189.
27
R.S.C. 1970, c. N-1, s. 5(2). The Narcotic Control Act was later replaced by the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, supra, note 3, which now includes numerous mandatory
minimum sentences.
28
Smith, supra, note 5, at para. 55.
26
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The decision in Smith rejected the suggestion that prosecutorial discretion (i.e., to lay a lesser charge or to proceed summarily where that is
an option) can render valid a mandatory minimum sentence that violates
section 12 in its application either to the individual before the court or
based on a reasonable hypothetical.29 The Court rejected the notion that
the responsibility to mitigate the potentially unconstitutional severity of a
mandatory sentence could be assigned to prosecutors, parole boards or
anyone else.30 This issue features in a significant way in Smickle, since
the offence in issue is a hybrid one whereby the Crown may proceed by
indictment (in which case the mandatory three-year sentence applies) or
by summary conviction (in which case there is a maximum sentence of
one year in jail and no mandatory minimum).
Since Smith, the Supreme Court has found only one other sentence to
violate section 12. In Steele v. Mountain Institution,31 the Court held that
the continued detention of a man who had been imprisoned for 37 years
under an earlier incarnation of a dangerous offender provision was
grossly disproportionate. However, the Court stressed the particular facts
of the case, stating that the test must be “stringent and demanding” so as
not to “trivialize the Charter”.32
Kent Roach has characterized the post-Smith Supreme Court decisions upholding mandatory minimum sentences as moving from activism
to minimalism in interpreting and applying section 12.33 For example, in
R. v. Morrisey,34 a majority of the Court insisted that any reasonable
hypothetical must be common (for example, unfortunate hunting accidents), going so far as to exclude the facts of real, reported cases that
were considered unusual or rare.35 This deferential approach represents a
significant departure from Smith, where the willingness to centre the
analysis around an uncommon, yet reasonable hypothetical fact situation
meant that the invalidity of the seven-year mandatory minimum could be
addressed directly, without waiting for an inevitable injustice to actually
happen. Roach notes that “[g]iven the realities of both prosecutorial
discretion and plea bargaining, it might have taken forever for the perfect

29
30
31
32
33
34
35

Id., at paras. 68-69.
Roach, “Searching for Smith”, supra, note 19, at 382.
[1990] S.C.J. No. 111, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1385 (S.C.C.).
Id., at 1417.
Roach, “Searching for Smith”, supra, note 19, at 381-86.
[2000] S.C.J. No. 39, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Morrisey”].
Id., at para. 50.
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small-time offender — the teenaged student coming home from Florida
with a joint of marijuana — to have appeared before the Court.”36
In addition to limiting the scope of reasonable hypotheticals, the
Court in the post-Smith cases accepts as constitutionally valid the way
that mandatory minimum sentences raise the floor set by Parliament and
ratchet up sentences generally. Justice Arbour dissented in Morrisey,
although she did not find the four-year mandatory minimum sentence
invalid, expressing concerns about the “inflationary floor” and the
potential that it could be grossly disproportionate in individual cases.37
Jamie Cameron has characterized the interpretation of section 12 by
the Supreme Court post-Smith as a “faint hope” provision that should be
reinvigorated.38 As a companion argument to a proposal that section 7
should be limited to procedural review, Cameron argues that section 12
should do more analytical work to address substantive criminal law. In
particular, she argues that section 12 should require proportionality
between fault and punishment, not simply focus on (gross) disproportionality. She is also critical of the way that the Supreme Court has
considered fault, in an abstract, de-contextualized way in section 12
analysis.39
In R. v. Latimer,40 the Supreme Court rejected an argument that the
mandatory minimum sentence for murder (a life sentence with no parole
eligibility for at least 10 years) was grossly disproportionate in the case
of a father who killed his daughter who had a serious physical disability,
a case of so-called “compassionate killing”.41 The Court took a highly
deferential stance, stating that “[t]he choice is Parliament’s on the use of
minimum sentences, though considerable difference of opinion continues

36

Roach, “Searching for Smith”, supra, note 19, at 382.
Morrisey, supra, note 34, at para. 82.
38
Jamie Cameron, “Fault and Punishment under Sections 7 and 12 of the Charter” in
J. Cameron & J. Stribopoulos, eds., (2008) 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 553, at 583.
39
Id., at 588. See also Kent Roach, “The Charter versus the Government’s Crime Agenda”
in (2012) 58 S.C.L.R. (2d) (forthcoming) [hereinafter “Roach, ‘Charter versus Government’”].
40
[2001] S.C.J. No. 1, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Latimer”].
41
This characterization of Robert Latimer’s killing of his daughter, Tracy, as compassionate is contested by disability rights groups who argue that calls for leniency in relation to Robert
Latimer necessarily devalue the lives of people with disabilities. See Isabel Grant, “Rethinking the
Sentencing Regime for Murder” (2001) 39:2&3 Osgoode Hall L.J. 655, for an argument that this
approach, as well as the opposing position that Tracy’s death was a mercy killing for which Latimer
should not be culpable, both miss the mark. She argues that the Latimer case (and others) demonstrate that the sentencing regime for murder should be changed to eliminate the harsh minimum
parole ineligibility periods, maintain the distinction between murder and manslaughter, and build in
flexibility to allow judges to tailor the sentence to fit the crime.
37
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on the wisdom of employing minimum sentences from a criminal law
policy or penological point of view.”42
On the other hand, R. v. Wust43 is an example of the Supreme Court
acknowledging the disproportionate impact of mandatory minimum
sentences, albeit not in the context of interpreting section 12. Justice
Arbour makes it clear:
Mandatory minimum sentences are not the norm in this country, and
they depart from the general principles of sentencing expressed in the
Code, in the case law, and in the literature on sentencing. In particular,
they often detract from what Parliament has expressed as the
fundamental principle of sentencing in s. 718.1 of the Code: the
principle of proportionality.44

It is important to keep in mind that the decision in Wust did not require a
finding of Charter invalidity. It was merely a matter of statutory interpretation that credit for pre-trial custody could be considered by the sentencing judge to reduce a sentence below the statutory minimum. To do
otherwise would lead to the absurd result that a “best offender” who
received the minimum sentence (with no credit for pre-trial custody)
could serve more time than a “worse” offender who deserved a longer
sentence but was credited for pre-trial custody.45
The most recent consideration of a mandatory minimum sentence by
the Supreme Court came in the 2008 decision in R. v. Ferguson.46 In that
case, the Court cleared up years of uncertainty in the jurisprudence by
rejecting the use of constitutional exemptions to address exceptional
cases in which gross disproportionality would result from the imposition
of a mandatory minimum sentence. Chief Justice McLachlin held that the
legislative objective behind mandatory minimum sentences is the
removal of judicial discretion such that a constitutional exemption would
42

Latimer, supra, note 40, at para. 88.
[2000] S.C.J. No. 19, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 455 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Wust”].
Id., at para. 18.
45
Id., at para. 42.
46
[2008] S.C.J. No. 6, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 96 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ferguson”]. A subsequent
decision which addressed Charter issues in the context of mandatory minimum sentences but not on
the basis of s. 12 was R. v. Nasogaluak, [2010] S.C.J. No. 6, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Nasogaluak”]. In that decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the power of sentencing
judges to consider police or other state misconduct, whether amounting to a Charter violation or not,
as a mitigating factor that could reduce a sentence. Nasogaluak was an Indigenous man who was
badly beaten by the police in the course of his arrest for impaired driving. A unanimous Supreme
Court held that in “exceptional cases” it may even be appropriate to sentence below a mandatory
minimum sentence to provide a meaningful remedy for unconstitutional acts. However, on the facts
of the case, the minimum sentence of a $600 fine for a first offence of impaired driving was upheld.
43
44

(2012), 57 S.C.L.R. (2d) MINIMAL IMPACT ON MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES

157

be an unacceptable remedy. She went on to comment that if a law did
lead to gross disproportionality in a particular case (a finding she was not
willing to make in relation to Ferguson47), the Court would have to
declare the provision invalid.48 In an article published shortly after
Ferguson, Benjamin Berger suggested that the Court’s rejection of
constitutional exemptions “amounts to a constitutional push-back on the
politics of minimum sentences”.49
The next section considers a recent Ontario Superior Court decision
which may be characterized as just such a constitutional push-back on
the (lack of) logic behind at least one minimum sentence. The reasoning
of the Court and the potential implications of this case will be addressed.

III. SMICKLE: FERGUSON COMING HOME TO ROOST?
In the early morning hours of the night he was charged, Leroy
Smickle was lounging in his underwear in his cousin’s apartment,
holding a loaded gun in one hand and a laptop in the other, taking a
webcam photo of himself to post on Facebook. At that moment, the
police, bearing a search warrant, broke into the apartment looking for
illegal firearms believed to be owned by Smickle’s cousin. Smickle was
convicted of possession of a loaded firearm and careless storage of a
firearm. This “foolish act” as described by the judge did not warrant the
three-year mandatory minimum sentence for possession of a loaded
firearm which applied because the Crown had proceeded by indictment
pursuant to section 95(2) of the Criminal Code.50 She found that a threeyear sentence would be grossly disproportionate, amounting to cruel and
unusual punishment contrary to section 12 of the Charter.
With respect to the Smith standard that cruel and unusual punishment
requires a finding of gross disproportionality, Molloy J. looked to the
way that (arguably) subjective elements had been adopted as part of the
standard. In particular, she considered the language of “[shocking] the
conscience” and “[outraging] standards of decency” such that Canadians

47
Ferguson, supra, note 46, involved a police officer fatally shooting a man detained in
police cells following an altercation between the two men. The officer was originally charged with
murder but a jury convicted him of manslaughter, which carried a minimum four-year sentence
because it was committed with a firearm.
48
Ferguson, supra, note 46, at para. 57.
49
Berger, supra, note 19, at 105.
50
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
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“would find the punishment abhorrent or intolerable”.51 However, she
held that the test was largely an objective one:
I remain of the view that the analysis of what constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment is essentially an objective test. To the extent that
community tolerance is part of that test, it can only be with reference to
a community fully informed about the philosophy, principles and
purposes of sentencing set out in the Criminal Code, the rights
enshrined in the Charter, and the particular circumstances of the case
before the court.52

Justice Molloy stated that she would have reached the conclusion that the
mandatory three-year sentence was grossly disproportionate on either an
objective or subjective test: “In my opinion, a reasonable person ...
would consider a three year sentence to be fundamentally unfair, outrageous, abhorrent and intolerable.”53
The unique nature of this particular offence played a central role in
Smickle. The fact that the offence is a hybrid one with a summary option
that has no minimum sentence and a one-year maximum looms large.
This bifurcation and accompanying Crown discretion indicates that
Parliament has recognized that there are some circumstances in which
possession of a loaded firearm may justify no prison sentence at all.54
Justice Molloy concluded that the case before her was exceptional
because of the nature and purpose of the possession, meaning that an
appropriate sentence would lie outside the normal range. In deciding on a
one-year conditional sentence, she canvassed three comparator cases,
including one involving a former Ontario cabinet minister, John Snobelen, who had received an absolute discharge for the same offence in a
case where the Crown had proceeded summarily.55
In Smickle the structure of the hybrid scheme for prosecuting this
offence (a one-year maximum jail sentence if the Crown proceeds
summarily and a three-year minimum prison sentence if the Crown
proceeds by indictment) was held to be arbitrary and therefore breach
51

Smickle, supra, note 9, at paras. 42-46, citing Smith, supra, note 5, and other s. 12 cases.
Smickle, supra, note 9, at para. 47.
53
Id., at para. 89.
54
Id., at paras. 52-53.
55
R. v. Snobelen (April 25 2008), unreported (Ont. C.J.) Brown J., cited in Smickle, supra,
note 9, at paras. 69-70. Snobelen knowingly had a Colt 22 semiautomatic handgun, together with
ammunition and two other firearms, in his home for a number of years. He had acquired them when
he bought a ranch and its contents in Oklahoma. He testified that he had intended to turn the guns in,
but neglected to do so. The guns were discovered during a police search based on information from
Snobelen’s estranged wife.
52
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section 7 of the Charter. It is impossible to have a sentence in the twoyear gap between the one-year maximum and three-year minimum
sentence. The existence of this two-year gap is clearly irrational.56 In so
finding Molloy J. relied on much of the reasoning of Code J. in R. v.
Nur57 (in which Nur was ultimately unsuccessful in his challenge to the
same mandatory minimum sentence). Justice Code found a violation of
section 7 but found that Nur lacked standing to raise it because he was
not within the range of people “who would reasonably have faced
summary proceedings, but for the arbitrary two year ‘gap’” in section
95(2)(b).58
Having found that section 95(2)(b) violated section 12 and section 7
of the Charter, Molloy J. proceeded to consider whether the limit on
rights was justified as a reasonable limit pursuant to section 1 of the
Charter. Noting that section 7 violations are rarely salvageable by section
1 and expressing doubt that “inflicting cruel and unusual punishment on
an individual can be justified based on an overall legislative objective of
general deterrence,”59 Molloy J. spent most of her time on minimal
impairment, focusing on arguments about whether and how a “safety
valve” of discretion could save the section. The Crown argued that the
existing prosecutorial discretion was the necessary safety valve, while
the defence asserted that only judicial discretion to depart from the
mandatory minimum sentence (i.e., through a constitutional exemption
or other means) in exceptional cases could render the law valid.60
The Court rejected the Crown’s argument, noting that prosecutorial
discretion did not operate to prevent Smickle from being subjected to
cruel and unusual punishment. Justice Molloy did not find fault with the
Crown’s decision to proceed by indictment against Smickle, stating that
“[a]t the time that decision was made, the Crown was not in possession
of all of the facts necessary to inform that decision. The decision was
56
The version of s. 95(2) included in the 1996 amendments to the Code provided for a
maximum one-year sentence (summary conviction) and a minimum one-year sentence (indictable).
The new, three-year minimum for an indictable offence was added in the 2008 amendments without
apparent consideration of the resulting “two-year gap”. See R. v. Nur, [2011] O.J. No. 3878, 275
C.C.C. (3d) 330, at para. 131 [hereinafter “Nur”].
57
Id.
58
Id., at para. 140.
59
Id., at para. 101.
60
In a similar vein, the Canadian Bar Association argued in its submissions to Parliament
on Bill C-10 that such a judicial safety valve should be incorporated into any legislated minimum
sentence to address Charter concerns and the principle of proportionality. Canadian Bar Association,
Submission on Bill C-10: Safe Streets and Communities Act, online: <http://www.cba.org/cba/
submissions/PDF/11-45-eng.pdf> [hereinafter “Canadian Bar Association”].
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made reasonably and in good faith and there is no basis to interfere with
it.”61 However, she cited Smith for the proposition that the “safety valve”
of Crown discretion cannot save legislation that may result in a grossly
disproportionate sentence: “... the courts are duty bound to make that
pronouncement [that a law is invalid pursuant to section 52(1)], not to
delegate the avoidance of a violation to the prosecution or to anyone else
for that matter.”62
The defence argued that a judicial safety valve, effectively transforming mandatory sentences into presumptive sentences from which a
judge could depart in exceptional circumstances or where an injustice
would result from their imposition, would be a minimally impairing
alternative to the rigid mandatory minimum in section 95(2)(b). The
Crown had argued that such judicial discretion would defeat the whole
purpose of the legislation which is to ensure stiffer sentences for possession of loaded firearms by taking away judicial discretion, a proposition
which the court in Smickle rejected. Justice Molloy agreed with the
defence that such an approach, utilized in the United Kingdom and South
Africa, is a minimally impairing alternative.63
At the final stage of proportionality, she notes pointedly that “there is
no tangible evidence that imposing a mandatory minimum does anything
to actually accomplish [the objectives of reducing violent crime and
protecting the public]. One might hope that would be the case, but
proving it is a far different matter.”64
The Crown argued in Smickle that if the minimum sentence was
found to violate section 12 on Smickle’s facts, the appropriate remedy
should be some form of mandamus or a reduction of sentence. However,
Molloy J. did not accept this argument, noting that both proposed
remedies amount to constitutional exemptions which were flatly rejected
by the Supreme Court in Ferguson. In accordance with that decision, a
declaration of invalidity is the only remedy available to a judge who has
found that a mandatory sentence violates section 12 and is not saved by
section 1. Furthermore, it is significant that the Crown’s call for a
suspended declaration of invalidity was flatly rejected by the Court in
Smickle. While suspended declarations have become almost common61

Smickle, supra, note 9, at para. 87.
Smith, supra, note 5, at para. 69, cited in Smickle, supra, note 9, at para. 109.
63
Smickle, supra, note 9, at paras. 114-116; see also Julian V. Roberts, Mandatory Sentences of Imprisonment in Common Law Jurisdictions: Some Representative Models, online:
Department of Justice <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/rs/rep-rap/2005/rr05_10/index.html>.
64
Smickle, supra, note 9, at para. 120.
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place in Charter decisions, Molloy J. returned to the high threshold
articulated in Schachter v. Canada,65 namely, that delaying the effect of a
declaration of invalidity should be rare and exceptional.66 This more
stringent approach is welcome, both in this case because a suspended
declaration would have deprived Leroy Smickle of any remedy,67 and in
the law more broadly because suspended declarations have been proliferating, based on appeals to “dialogue” between courts and legislatures,68
rather than for the limited reasons articulated in Schachter.
In the end, Leroy Smickle spent a significant amount of time in jail
pending trial, notwithstanding the ultimate disposition of a one-year
conditional sentence. When he was on bail he was under strict conditions
amounting to house arrest. He received seven months’ credit for time
served and for restrictions on his liberty while on bail. Smickle certainly
paid for his “foolish act”.

IV. SMICKLE AND A POSSIBLE DEPARTURE FROM
CHARTER MINIMALISM
For some time, criminal and constitutional law scholars have been
lamenting the minimalist, deferential approach to Charter scrutiny of
mandatory minimum sentences. In 2001, reacting to the decisions in R. v.
Goltz69 and Morrisey, Kent Roach called for a return to the activism of
Smith, arguing that “vigorous judicial enforcement against cruel and
unusual punishment by striking down mandatory sentences has the
potential to produce a robust and democratic dialogue between the courts
and the legislature that considers both the effect of punishment on
offenders and the adequacy of less draconian alternatives.”70
Writing in the wake of Ferguson, Lisa Dufraimont and Benjamin
Berger took different approaches to the future of section 12 challenges to
mandatory minimum sentences. Dufraimont interpreted the Court’s
65

[1992] S.C.J. No. 68, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Schachter”].
Smickle, supra, note 9, at para. 151.
See Kent Roach, “New and Problematic Restrictions on Constitutional Remedies: R. v.
Demers” Editorial Comment (2004) 49:3 Crim. L.Q. 253 (discussing the injustice involved in the
refusal to permit a constitutional exemption from a delayed declaration of invalidity in the context of
an individual with a chronic mental disability who was found unfit to stand trial).
68
Sujit Choudhry & Kent Roach, “Putting the Past Behind Us? Prospective Judicial and
Legislative Constitutional Remedies” (2003) 21 S.C.L.R. (2d) 205; Bruce Ryder, “Suspending the
Charter” (2003) 21 S.C.L.R. (2d) 267.
69
[1991] S.C.J. No. 90, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 485 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Goltz”].
70
Roach, “Searching for Smith”, supra, note 19, at 411.
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rejection of constitutional exemptions as a retreat from substantive
scrutiny of mandatory minimum sentences and a “lost opportunity” to
provide a remedy for exceptional cases that will inevitably be caught
within the wide net of mandatory penalties.71 On the other hand, Berger
argued that Ferguson amounted to a “constitutional push-back on the
politics of minimum sentences”.72 He supported the Court’s rejection of a
role for the judiciary in “mopping up the hard cases with constitutional
exemptions”, which would lend legitimacy to a legislative process that
may not have paid sufficient attention to the substantive fairness of the
laws it creates.73 While Dufraimont essentially argued that the spectre of
invalidating a mandatory sentence for all purposes, based on an exceptional case, would exert substantial pressure on judges to uphold laws in
the face of compelling exceptional cases that might arise, Berger expressed more confidence in the ability and willingness of sentencing
judges — and implicitly appellate courts — to make unpopular decisions
when faced with compelling cases.
How, then, should we understand Smickle? Is it a courageous decision in the face of immense pressure? And what is the Supreme Court of
Canada likely to do when this case inevitably comes before it? Might
Smickle signal a new, more rigorous approach to assessing mandatory
minimum sentences under the Charter?74
On one level, the application of sections 7 and 12 of the Charter in
Smickle addresses the worst, most irrational elements of the law. The
two-year gap that arose through piecemeal amendments to the Criminal
Code, ratcheting up the floor for this offence, is rightly found to be
arbitrary. In fact, the two-year gap is completely irrational and it is
surprising that it had not been addressed earlier by the courts or Parliament.75 This was, in many ways, an easy case. That said, outside of Smith
and Steele, the Supreme Court has not been persuaded to utilize section
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Dufraimont, supra, note 19, at 470. See also Kent Roach, “The Future of Mandatory
Sentences after the Death of Constitutional Exemptions” Editorial Comment (2008) 54:1 Crim. L.Q. 1.
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Berger, supra, note 19, at 105.
73
Id., at 119.
74
As this manuscript was being finalized for publication, another decision to declare a
mandatory minimum sentence invalid was released: R. v. L. (C.), [2012] O.J. No. 3094, 2012 ONCJ
413 (Ont. C.J.) (mandatory three-year sentence for the broadly framed offence of trafficking a
firearm).
75
In Nur, supra, note 56, at para. 131, Code J. had reviewed the legislative history of the
provision and concluded that the two-year gap was probably an oversight that had not been
corrected. He found a violation of s. 7 but declined to address it because an appropriate sentence for
Nur was outside of the gap.
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12 in cases that presented sympathetic facts, although some lower courts
have.76
It is possible to conclude that the positions of both Berger and
Dufraimont have been vindicated by Smickle, at least at this early stage.
Given the indefensible arbitrariness of the two-year gap between the
maximum summary conviction sentence and the minimum indictable
offence sentence, the result was inevitable and obvious to many. Justice
Code had as much as said so in Nur. Justice Molloy just finally had the
facts. However, the very fact that Code J. did not declare the law invalid
in Nur when he was faced with the section 7 arbitrariness argument is an
example of Charter minimalism in operation.
Dufraimont has argued that “[t]he fundamental problem is that the
persistence of an invalid mandatory minimum sentence has distorting
effects,”77 such as exerting pressure on accused persons to plead to lesser
offences to avoid overly broad mandatory minimum sentences. Liz
Sheehy has noted the distorting effects of mandatory sentences, particularly for battered women who are charged with murder in relation to the
death of their abusive partners.78 In the course of her section 1 analysis in
Smickle, Molloy J. listed this and a number of other “deleterious effects
of the mandatory minimum regime”, including the following:
(1) the sentence inflation for persons who, although not deserving a
sentence of less than a one year sentence, must now receive at least
three years; (2) the danger of increased recidivism by incarcerating
youthful first offenders for extended periods of time with hardened
criminals; (3) contributing to the over-crowded conditions in our
correctional facilities; (4) the systemic disincentive for guilty pleas and
early resolutions if the minimum sentence will be three years in prison
for any offender charged with the indictable offence; and, (5) as the
Supreme Court noted in Smith, the unfair advantage given to the Crown
as an accused will be under pressure to plead guilty to a lesser included
offence in order to avoid the risk of the mandatory minimum.79

Given the deferential, minimalist approach that has been taken to
section 12, the focus of much commentary has been on the “exceptional
76
For example, the sentencing judges in Morrisey, supra, note 34, and Latimer, supra, note
40, had found the mandatory sentence to be grossly disproportionate. However, those findings were
reversed on appeal.
77
Dufraimont, supra, note 19, at 477, citing Smith, supra, note 5, at para. 5.
78
Elizabeth Sheehy, “Battered Women and Mandatory Minimum Sentences” (2001) 39:2&3
Osgoode Hall L.J. 529.
79
Smickle, supra, note 9, at para. 121.
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cases” that are caught by the rising threshold of the sentencing floor and
the need for a judicial “safety valve”.80 If the Supreme Court had
authorized a judicial “safety valve” in the form of a constitutional
exemption in Ferguson,81 arguably Parliament’s intention to treat gun
crimes more harshly across the board could have been largely satisfied as
long as constitutional exemptions were rarely applied. The impact of
such a change, namely providing a remedy for “exceptional cases”,
would arguably be modest.82 Perhaps a more significant change would be
for the Supreme Court to revisit the narrow approach to reasonable
hypotheticals taken in Goltz and Morrisey, authorizing consideration of a
whole range of potential scenarios. However, if the high standard of
“gross disproportionality” continues to be applied, then such a change
does little to address the fundamentally arbitrary nature of mandatory
minimum sentences.
Arguments that lend legitimacy to the ratcheting up of sentences
generally by simply increasing the starting point for the sentence and
maintaining proportionality are problematic in the sense that they leave
the inflationary starting point unscrutinized. As argued by Roach, they
“aspire to a just distribution of punishment while being agnostic about
the justness of the starting point or anchor for their finely calibrated
scale”.83 He goes on to make the important point that “judicial concerns
about maintaining proportionality in light of mandatory sentences
attribute a coherence to Parliament’s decision to enact a mandatory
sentence that is not realistic.”84
The bigger picture that emerges when one considers the proliferation
of mandatory minimum sentences through piecemeal changes to our
sentencing laws, and the Charter decisions mostly upholding them, is an
80

See e.g., Dufraimont, supra, note 19; Canadian Bar Association, supra, note 60.
Proponents of this approach essentially advocate for the transformation of mandatory
minimum sentences into presumptive sentences, along the lines of the model in the United Kingdom.
See also Morris J. Fish, “An Eye for an Eye: Proportionality as a Moral Principle of Punishment”
(2008) 28:1 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 57, at 71 (“Whether Canada should move [in the direction of
presumptive sentences] from the mandatory sentencing scheme currently in place is, in principle, a
matter for Parliament to decide”).
82
Kent Roach advocates for such a focus on the disproportionate effects of a particular
mandatory sentence on a particular (exceptional) offender, rather than on attempts to prove that the
mandatory sentence is arbitrary in relation to its legislative objective. Roach, “Charter versus
Government”, supra, note 39. I sketch out some elements of the latter, admittedly more expansive,
argument below.
83
Roach, “Searching for Smith”, supra, note 19, at 402.
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Id., at 403, drawing on Julian V. Roberts, “The Hunt for the Paper Tiger: Conditional
Sentencing after Brady” (1999) 42:1 Crim. L.Q. 38.
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overall sense of irrationality and arbitrariness.85 The Criminal Code is
desperately in need of a principled, evidence-based overhaul.86 However,
there are no prospects for such changes any time soon. To the contrary,
the lack of respect for — and indeed, open hostility to — research that
contradicts the policy choices of the current government is palpable.87
In a recent op-ed piece published in the Ottawa Citizen on the 30th
anniversary of the Charter, Kent Roach argued that
there are signs that the Charter will not provide significant restraints on
increased use of mandatory sentences and increased use of prison. ...
[T]he Charter, like the media, tends to focus only on the worst cases of
abuse; not the routine cases. New restrictions on conditional sentences
and mandatory sentences will change how routine cases are processed
everyday in court.88

Roach suggests the Charter will probably have little to say about that.
In this climate, judges will likely continue to chip away at the most
obvious injustices. Section 12 comes into play in Smickle, but only in
relation to an “exceptional case” that, I would argue, merely points to
deeper problems with mandatory sentences generally. These exceptional
cases are the canaries in the coal mine that should prompt a reassessment
of our reliance on counter-productive, blunt instruments such as mandatory minimum sentences. The decision in Smickle does not, and perhaps
85
As just one demonstration of incoherence among provisions in the Criminal Code, the
factum of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association in Nur, supra, note 56, compares the sentences
available under s. 95(2) for possession of a loaded firearm — a maximum one-year sentence or a
minimum three-year sentence — to sentences available for other crimes involving guns. Under s.
87(1) there is no mandatory minimum for pointing a loaded or unloaded firearm at someone; under
s. 85(1) there is a mandatory minimum sentence of one year for using a firearm while committing or
attempting to commit an indictable offence (such as aggravated assault); and under s. 220(a) there is
a mandatory minimum sentence of four years for criminal negligence causing death where a firearm
is used. Nur, supra, note 56 (Factum of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, at para. 53).
86
Beyond the sentencing framework, Don Stuart has long argued for a General Part to the
Criminal Code which would set out important principles and that would assist in interpreting and
rationalizing the offences, defences and procedures in Canadian criminal law. Don Stuart, “A Case
for a General Part: Lessons from Canada’s Experience with Stephen’s Code Since 1892 and
Entrenched Charter Standards since 1982” (2009) 20:1 Crim. L.F. 113.
87
For example, in recent hearings before the House of Commons Committee considering
Bill C-10, Conservative members of the Committee dismissed as “advocates for criminals” and “too
far removed from real life” witnesses such as Dr. Anthony Doob, one of North America’s leading
criminologists, and Catherine Latimer, Executive Director of the John Howard Society and a former
Director General of Youth Justice, Strategic Initiatives and Law Reform, with the federal Department
of Justice. See Heather Scoffield, “Critics of omnibus bill ‘advocate for criminals,’ Conservatives
charge” The Globe and Mail (October 18, 2011), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/
politics/critics-of-omnibus-bill-advocate-for-criminals-conservatives-charge/article4255428/>.
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Kent Roach, “The government v. the Charter” The Ottawa Citizen (April 13, 2012) at B7.
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cannot, speak to the overall arbitrariness of popular punitivism and to the
disproportionality of mandatory sentences generally.
One of the most problematic implications of the virtually unrestrained proliferation of mandatory minimum sentences is the extent to
which prosecutorial discretion increases. A very significant result of the
move to mandatory minimum sentences is a wholesale transfer of
discretion from judges to prosecutors. Whether intended or not, this
move signals a profound lack of trust in judges (whose decisions are, of
course, reviewable through the appellate process) and a simultaneous
transfer of discretion, and implicitly trust, to Crown Attorneys (whose
decisions are virtually unassailable due to the high degree of deference
accorded to prosecutorial discretion which is reviewable only for abuse
of process).89 In Nur, a case that raised essentially the same issues as
Smickle (although the mitigating circumstances were not as sympathetic
in Nur), the sentencing judge held that the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in proceeding by indictment or summary conviction was a
“complete answer” to all of the reasonable hypotheticals which he found
would amount to cruel and unusual punishment.90
Research largely conducted in the United States where there is now a
long history of mandatory minimum sentences reveals that “charge
bargaining” and other forms of evading the impact of mandatory minimums increase with the proliferation of minimum sentences.91 These and
other consequences are unintended and raise the spectre of arbitrariness,
which has been defined by the Supreme Court in the section 7 case law
as a measure that “bears no relation to, or is inconsistent with, the
objective”.92 To the extent that a key objective of mandatory sentences is,
as held by McLachlin C.J.C. in Ferguson,93 the removal of judicial
discretion in pursuit of greater certainty and consistency in sentencing,
most mandatory minimum sentences could be said to entail arbitrary

89
In R. v. Nixon, [2011] S.C.J. No. 34, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 566 (S.C.C.), the Supreme Court of
Canada recently reaffirmed that prosecutorial discretion is reviewable only for abuse of process. The
Crown’s repudiation of a signed plea agreement in that case was held not to amount to an abuse of
process.
90
Nur, supra, note 56, at paras. 104, 108.
91
Tonry, supra, note 12.
92
Chaoulli v. Québec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791, at
para. 130 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Chaoulli”], McLachlin C.J.C. and Major J., citing Rodriguez v.
British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] S.C.J. No. 94, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, at para. 203
(S.C.C.), McLachlin J. dissenting.
93
Ferguson, supra, note 46, at para. 54.
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deprivations of liberty.94 Ultimately, mandatory sentences do not remove
discretion; they simply transfer it from judges to Crown attorneys. That
result is inconsistent with the objective of removing discretion. At a
minimum, the approach that the Supreme Court has taken to the arbitrariness standard in criminal law should prompt greater scrutiny of the
relationship between the objective(s) of mandatory minimum sentences,
including other objectives such as deterring crime, and the extent to
which their consequences seem to be quite different and, in fact, disproportionately borne by certain groups over others.
Elizabeth Sheehy has drawn attention to the extent that mandatory
minimum sentences have a disproportionate impact on certain racialized
groups such as African Canadians and Indigenous peoples.95 A number of
the mandatory minimum sentence cases involve Indigenous or African
Canadian men: Morrisey, Nasogaluak, Nur, Smickle, and presumably
others that we do not know about. David Tanovich has lamented the
extent to which race is erased in criminal Charter cases, arguing that
“there has been a large-scale failure of trial lawyers to raise race once
critical race standards have been established by the courts,”96 particularly
in relation to racial profiling. Tanovich has further argued that courts
have ignored the “Golden principle” in Charter cases (the Golden
principle being that “[t]he Charter must be interpreted with a critical race
or anti-racist lens to give effect to systemic racism in the criminal justice
system including the over-policing of Aboriginal and racialized commu94
In the most recent Supreme Court of Canada decision to consider arbitrariness as a principle of fundamental justice, Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2011]
S.C.J. No. 44, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “PHS”], the unanimous Court found that the
decision of the federal government to not grant an exemption to a safe-injection program from the
relevant offences in the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act was arbitrary. With respect to the state
of the law on arbitrariness, the Court noted, at para. 132:
The jurisprudence on arbitrariness is not entirely settled. In Chaoulli, three justices (per
McLachlin C.J. and Major J.) preferred an approach that asked whether a limit was “necessary” to further the state objective: paras. 131-132. Conversely, three other justices
(per Binnie and LeBel JJ.), preferred to avoid the language of necessity and instead approved of the prior articulation of arbitrariness as where “[a] deprivation of a right ...
bears no relation to, or is inconsistent with, the state interest that lies behind the legislation”: para. 232. It is unnecessary to determine which approach should prevail, because
the government action at issue in this case qualifies as arbitrary under both definitions.
95
Elizabeth Sheehy, “The Discriminatory Effects of Bill C-15’s Mandatory Minimum
Sentences” (2010) 70:2 C.R. (6th) 302 (the mandatory minimum sentences for certain drug offences
that Sheehy was addressing in this article were later rolled into Bill C-10 and passed into law earlier
this year). See also Faizal R. Mirza, “Mandatory Minimum Prison Sentencing and Systemic Racism”
(2001) 39:2&3 Osgoode Hall L.J. 491.
96
David M. Tanovich, “The Charter of Whiteness: Twenty-Five Years of Maintaining
Racial Injustice in the Canadian Criminal Justice System” (2008) 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 655, at 672.
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nities”).97 In addition to race playing a significant role in policing,98
particularly where there is considerable discretion involved, it has been
found to play a salient role in prosecutorial decisions. Research in the
United States has found that members of certain racialized groups (such
as African-Americans and Latin-Americans) are disproportionately
subject to mandatory minimum sentences due to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.99
In the Canadian context, the Supreme Court has openly acknowledged the systemic discrimination experienced by Indigenous peoples in
the Canadian criminal justice system, particularly in cases dealing with
sentencing100 and imprisonment.101 Yet it is exceedingly difficult to
reconcile the elimination of judicial discretion entailed by the enactment
of mandatory minimums, in a context where Indigenous people are
grossly over-represented among those imprisoned, with the direction to
sentencing judges in section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code that “all
available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the
circumstances should be considered for all offenders, with particular
attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders.”102 This is one of
the many contradictions and incoherencies in our criminal law that

97
David M. Tanovich, “Ignoring the Golden Principle of Charter Interpretation?” (2008) 42
S.C.L.R. (2d) 441, at 443.
98
See generally Elizabeth Comack, Racialized Policing: Aboriginal People’s Encounters
with the Police (Halifax: Fernwood, 2012), at ch. 2.
99
Joshua B. Fischman & Max M. Schanzenbach, “Racial Disparities under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: The Role of Judicial Discretion and Mandatory Minimums” 9:4 J. Empirical
Legal Stud. (forthcoming in December 2012). Although there has been little, if any, focused research
into the relationship between prosecutorial discretion and race in the Canadian context, there have
been some disturbing recent cases of Crown misconduct involving racialized accused who were
subject to police brutality and later had their own charges stayed. See David M. Tanovich, “Bonds:
Gendered and Racialized Violence, Strip Searches, Sexual Assault and Abuse of Prosecutorial
Power” (2011) 79 C.R. (6th) 132. This is an area that requires further Canadian research such that
the impact of prosecutorial discretion in the context of mandatory sentences is better understood.
100
R. v. Gladue, [1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Gladue”].
101
Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2002] S.C.J. No. 66, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Sauvé”].
102
The recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Ipeelee, [2012] S.C.J. No.
13, 280 C.C.C. (3d) 265 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ipeelee”] amounts to a call for action to lawyers and
judges across the country who have not implemented s. 718.2(e) and the principles articulated in
Gladue, supra, note 100 in a meaningful way. Justice LeBel took great pains to emphasize the
importance of an individualized consideration of Gladue factors in every case involving an
Indigenous person. To do otherwise would violate the fundamental principle of proportionality and
invite appellate review (Ipeelee, at para. 87). A number of Indigenous leaders have criticized Bill
C-10 on the basis that it will exacerbate the over-representation of Indigenous people in Canadian
prisons. See Robert Everett-Green, “Law and disorder: What Bill C-10 could mean for Canada’s
native people” The Globe and Mail (February 18, 2012), at F1.
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should not be ignored when considering whether a mandatory sentence
violates the Charter.

V. CONCLUSION AND CHALLENGES NOTWITHSTANDING
It has been argued that “[g]ross disproportionality and arbitrariness
review [under section 7] may often boil down to trials by social science
experts” which the government is bound to win because it has deeper
pockets and thus a greater capacity to commission research and hire
experts.103 While this is admittedly a challenge, there are a number of
recent precedent-setting Charter decisions in which claimants have
introduced, and judges have duly considered, complex social science
evidence in the criminal law context.104 This careful treatment of social
science evidence stands in sharp contrast to the way that relatively
uncontroversial social science evidence concerning mandatory minimum
sentences was rejected outright on ideological grounds in recent parliamentary hearings.105
I am aware that my suggestion that the courts subject the purported
goals, justifications and impacts of mandatory minimum sentences to a
more searching form of Charter scrutiny is at odds with much of the
conventional thinking about the respective institutional roles and capacities of courts and legislatures. The deferential, minimalist approach in the
section 12 cases is based on the idea that it is generally not the courts’
role to question the policy choices of government.106 Even if it were
possible to truly separate policy choices from other government decisions that are appropriately the subject of judicial review, there are
numerous examples, particularly in the criminal context, where the
Supreme Court has seen fit to subject the government’s policy choices —
and the real impact of the law at issue — to searching review. For
example, in Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer),107 where a
majority of the Court declared invalid a ban on prisoners serving two
years or more from voting in federal elections, McLachlin C.J.C. held
103

Roach, “Charter versus Government”, supra, note 39.
Most recently, in Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2012] B.C.J. No. 1196, 2012
BCSC 886 (B.C.S.C.), Smith J considered many volumes of conflicting social science evidence in
the course of concluding that the criminal offence of assisting suicide unjustifiably infringes ss. 7
and 15 of the Charter.
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that the government’s objectives for disenfranchising citizen prisoners,
namely enhancing civic responsibility and providing additional punishment, were too vague and symbolic to justify limiting the right to vote.
Her decision rejected the government’s attempts to justify the voting ban
in a remarkably robust fashion which included, for example, calling the
government’s arguments a “façade of rhetoric”.108 The majority also
pointed to the fact that the government had not produced any evidence
demonstrating that its objectives for the voting ban were being met,
while there was evidence of the disproportionate impact of the voting
ban on Indigenous prisoners who were, and are, overrepresented among
the prison population.
Of course, there are many other decisions in which a more deferential stance has been taken. However, my point is simply that policy
choices in the context of criminal law are not immune from meaningful
Charter scrutiny, particularly where they affect basic civil and political
rights and where it appears that they are not evidence-based. We are
arguably seeing a resurgence in substantive review of criminal law under
the Charter, at least under section 7, with the recent decisions in Bedford
v. Canada (Attorney General)109 and Canada v. PHS Community Services.110 In the latter case, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the
federal Health Minister’s decision to not grant an exemption from criminal
drug laws for the Insite safe-injection clinic in Vancouver was arbitrary
because it was inconsistent with the objective of promoting public health
and public safety and was contradicted by the weight of social science
evidence supporting the health outcomes achieved through the clinic. The
Minister’s decision in PHS was based on a government policy choice that
favoured a punitive approach to injection drug use over a harm reduction
approach when the latter was strongly supported by the social science
evidence. To be sure, the Court did not find the drug offences themselves
invalid, but rather focused their decision on the “safety valve” of the
exemption clause which, they held, prevented the drug offences from
applying in an arbitrary manner.111 As such, the decision in PHS is
arguably more consistent with an approach to Charter review that would
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permit constitutional exemptions, which have also been characterized as
safety valves, than with a finding of invalidity. However, constitutional
exemptions are not available under Ferguson to save mandatory minimum sentences. Therefore, if courts are to abandon their deferential
stance in this area, their decisions will likely lead to findings of invalidity
along the lines of Smickle.
A further implication of my call for greater scrutiny of the relationship between the objectives and actual consequences of mandatory
minimum sentences, particularly if it leads to findings of invalidity, is
that it may well put the courts on a collision course with a federal
government that is clearly committed to going down the punitive path it
has carved out. In a manner unprecedented in the Charter era, the current
government openly states its disagreement with Charter decisions made
by the courts112 and expresses little enthusiasm for the Charter itself.113
An “activist” decision that strikes down a mandatory minimum sentence
may be just the issue that would persuade the federal government to
invoke the section 33 legislative override.114
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Nevertheless, it is my view that we have reached a point where
someone has to say that the Emperor has no clothes. There is a compelling argument to be made that mandatory sentences deprive people of
their liberty in a manner that is arbitrary. They have unintended consequences that undercut their own purposes.115 To the extent that the courts
have deferred to Parliament’s faulty logic and purposes that are contradicted by a substantial and growing body of evidence, they have lent
legitimacy to a broken system that has immense human and fiscal costs.
A more robust form of judicial review of mandatory minimum sentences
on Charter grounds is not a full answer to addressing the proliferation of
harmful criminal justice policies that are not evidence-based. However,
there is a role for judges to play in examining the evidence where
policy makers do not. It is my hope that by the time we mark the Charter’s next big anniversary, we will be able to celebrate its role in contributing to a retreat from mandatory minimum sentences as one of its
accomplishments.
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